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Abstract
This paper discusses within a common analytical framework the
logical and analytical links between theories of exchange rate crises
that model the abandonment of a peg as an optimizing decision by ra
tional policy makers, and theories that focus on the dynamics of spec
ulative attacks when policies are incoherent with the indefinite defense
of the current nominal parity. We show that, in both cases, the con
dition for a crisis to occur can be expressed by a simple arbitrage rule
on exchange rates. We analyze the different economic mechanisms
underlying the common arbitrage rule. We also discuss a common
mechanism raising the possibility of multiple instantaneous equilibria
and self-fulfilling speculative attacks.
KEY WORDS: Speculative Attacks, Exchange Rate Crises
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Two styles of modelling currency crises

This paper reconsiders the literature on exchange rate crises by contrasting
two main approaches to modelling a currency collapse. According to the
first approach, the crisis is triggered by the behavior of private agents: the
*Correspondence to: Giancarlo Corsetti, Dip. Economia, Universita' degli Studi Roma
Tre, Via Ostiense 139, 00145 Roma, Italy. E-mail: corsetti @ elektra.econ.yale.edu.
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analysis is focused on the dynamics and timing of speculative attacks in the
foreign exchange markets. According to the alternative approach, abandon
ing the defense of an exchange rate parity (or target zone) is ultimately a
policy decision. The analysis is therefore focused on policy makers' prefer
ences and behavior. Differently from other contributions (see Obstfeld [1994]
and Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1996] among others), we contrast these
two modelling styles within a common analytical framework. Starting from
the specification of a small open economy, we presents two analyses of an
exchange rate crisis, each representing one modelling style, and contrast the
arbitrage mechanism that triggers the crisis.
The first approach, pioneered by Krugman [1979], takes speculative at
tacks as the proximate cause of an exchange rate crisis. Speculative attacks
are the optimal market reaction to policies that are inconsistent with the in
definite survival of a fixed nominal parity. The simplest version of the model
assumes a lower bound on international reserves beyond which the parity
is no longer defended, while domestic credit expansion persistently exceeds
the growth of money demand. Under both these assumptions, the exchange
rate regime must eventually collapse, even in the absence of a speculative
attack: for a given money demand in a credible peg, international reserves
shrinks at the same rate of domestic credit expansion, and reach their lower
bound in finite time. The event of an exchange rate crisis without a specu
lative attack, defined "natural collapse" by Grilli [1986], is associated with
jumps in both the interest and the exchange rates. In competitive markets,
however, rational expectations rule out the possibility of anticipated jumps
in prices providing clear arbitrage opportunities. The actual collapse of the
parity must therefore occur before the natural collapse. In each period, pri
vate agents can attack the currency, drive reserves to their lower bound and
force the policy maker to abandon the exchange rate target. An exchange
rate crisis will thus occur as soon as a speculative attack on the currency
yields non-negative profits.
The exact timing of the crisis of a fixed exchange rate regime may nonethe
less be indeterminate. A seminal paper by Obstfeld (Obstfeld [1986]) makes
this point by assuming that the rate of domestic credit expansion becomes
inconsistent with the defense of the nominal parity only conditional on the
realization of a speculative attack. For the same fundamentals of the econ
omy (say, for the same level of wages and the same realization of exogenous
shocks to productivity and velocity), it is possible to have two instantaneous
equilibria: one is characterized by a run on foreign exchange reserves, that
2

triggers a policy switch and therefore leads to the collapse of the exchange
rate regime; in the other equilibrium, no attack occurs and the current parity
is maintained. As a result, the timing of the attack depends on the coordina
tion of the private sector expectations on a particular regime. In this paper,
we offer a different characterization of multiple instantaneous equilibria in
a Krugman-style model, that stresses the conceptual and analytical analogy
with the second approach.
The second approach is championed by Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti
[1995, 1996], De Kock and Grilli [1993), Drazen and Masson [1993], Flood,
Bhandari and Horne [1989), Obstfeld [1991, 1994] and Ozkan and Sutherland
[1994] among others. As in Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1996), we will re
fer to it as the "endogenous policy approach" to modelling currency crises.
The analysis focuses on rational policy makers who use the exchange rate as
an optimization instrument. The peg of the exchange rate can be used, for
example, as a means to gain anti-inflationary credibility. The policy maker
decides whether to defend or to abandon the current parity weighting social
costs and benefits of each regime.
As the commitment to defend the nominal parity is only imperfectly
credible, the expectations game between the private sector and the policy
maker may generate multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, the private sector
develops expectations of exchange rate stability, reducing nominal wages and
interest rates. This lowers the benefits from a devaluation and strengthen
the policy-maker ability to defend the exchange rate parity. In a second
equilibrium, agents assign a high probability to a realignment, driving up
wages and interest rates and making the regime more vulnerable to domestic
and foreign shocks. Thus, the timing of the crisis is indeterminate, insofar
as the stability of the exchange rate may be affected by a sudden shift in the
regime of expectations.
This paper aims to explore the logical and analytical links between the
Krugman's approach and the endogenous policy approach. Section 2 presents
a model of a small open economy. Within this common specification of the
economy, we will describe the mechanics of speculative attacks leading to
the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime in Section 3, and analyze ratio
nal policy making resulting in an exchange rate crisis in Section 4. In each
section, we will begin with a characterization of monetary policy; we will
then move to the analysis of the arbitrage condition underlying the crisis; we
will analyze the mechanics of the crisis; finally we will explore the possibil
ity of multiple instantaneous equilibria and discuss the role of self-fulfilling
3

speculative attacks. Section 5 presents our conclusions.

A common analytical framework

2
2 .1

The structure of the economy

This section describes the structure of a small open economy that includes an
aggregate supply function and a monetary sector. Unless otherwise specified,
all variables (except interest rates) are expressed in logarithms. The real
sector is as in Obstfeld [1994]. The aggregate supply is a function of the real
wage and of a productivity shock:
Yt

= a (pt -

Wt) - Ut

where Pt is the price level, Wt the nominal wage and Ut a productivity dis
turbance that is identically and independently distributed with a zero mean.
The model is characterized by nominal wage rigidity: all wage contracts are
signed at the beginning of each period, and are valid for one period only.
Workers' objective function is quadratic in the deviation of income from its
equilibrium value (Yt = 0). With rational expectations, the optimal wage is
thus equal to the expected price level1 :

(2)
where Et-1 is the expectation operator conditional on information available
in period t - l.
Money demand is a function of income, nominal interest rate, it and of a
velocity shock, At :

(3)
Money supply differs in the two approaches to currency crises under consid
eration. It will be specified in Sections 3 and 4 below.
We assume both uncovered interest parity (UIP)
1 The

workers' objective function is

The expression in the text derives from the first order condition EtYt

= 0.

it

= i; + Et[et+1] -

et

(4)

and purchasing power parity (PPP)

(5)
where the foreign nominal interest rate ii is stationary and the foreign price
level is constant and equal to one, so that the nominal exchange rate coincides
with the domestic price level.

2.2

The semi-reduced form

Substituting the aggregate supply (1), the demand for money (3) and the
PPP condition (5) in the uncovered interest parity condition (4), we can de
scribe the dynamics of the exchange rate in terms of the following differential
equation:

Solving this differential equation forward under the appropriate transversality
condition, the equilibrium exchange rate can be expressed as a function of
four variables: the current wage level Wt, that is predetermined during the
period; a linear combination of the current and the expected future money
supply; a contemporaneous productivity shock, 'Uti and an index of nominal
shocks Et, that includes exogenous uncertainty regarding velocity and the
foreign interest rate

where the index of nominal shocks €tis a forward-looking variable:

Note that the expression (7) incorporates the equilibrium condition in the
labor market (2): with one-period contracts, the difference between expected
future wages and exchange rates is zero. The equilibrium exchange rate in
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semi-reduced form (7) together with the labor market equilibrium condition
(2) will be our main analytical tools in Sections 2 and 3 below. In these sec
tions, we will analyze a currency crisis following the two alternative modelling
styles. As the specification of monetary policy is very different in the two
models, we will begin our discussion from a description of monetary policy
in relation to the policy makers' macroeconomic goals.

3

Krugman-style models of exchange rate crises

Krugman-style models of exchange rate crises focus on the optimizing behav
ior of private markets during a crisis. The public sector behavior is generally
reduced to a policy function that is informally related to (rather than formally
derived from) specific policy objectives. Spotlights are on private agents, that
determine a crisis arbitrating profits across exchange rate regimes.

3.1

A policy function

The basic ingredients of Krugman [1979] analysis are well known. The first
one is an exogenously given process driving domestic credit, such as

(8)
where dt is domestic credit and {t is white noise. Informally, the process of
domestic credit expansion (8) is sometimes related to the need for seigniorage
that arises in the presence of persistent budget deficits. The second basic
ingredient is a lower limit to the stock of international reserves, below which
the monetary authorities stop defending the exchange rate parity et. Some
contributions in the literature have related this limit to public sector solvency
assuming a high opportunity cost of borrowing reserves (for a discussion see
Buiter [1987]). For the sake of simplicity, we normalize the lower threshold
on reserves to zero

(9)
where Rt is the level of reserves. Note that combining the two assumptions
(8) and (9) is equivalent to imposing a lower bound on money supply:
1nt ~

In(Dt + R)

(10)

where Dt denotes the level of domestic credit. Expressions (8) and (9) char
acterize our policy function.

6

3.2

Speculative attacks and arbitrage in the foreign
exchange market

Using a Krugman-style specification, the analyst is interested in modelling
markets' behavior around a crisis. Rational agents know that, given the
policy function defined by (8) and (9), no fixed parity et can be sustained
indefinitely. This point can be illustrated by means of a simple argument.
Suppose that markets consider the parity et perfectly credible so that the
wage level coincides with the exchange rate parity. Then, money demand is
stationary, depending only on exogenous shocks

(11)
Against a stationary money demand, domestic credit is trended. Over time,
the process of domestic credit expansion tends to drive international reserves
towards their lower limit. As a result, the current parity is bound to be
abandoned in finite time with probability one. The question is then: should
rational agents wait for such a "natural collapse" of the exchange rate regime,
or act before that?
Private agents can, in each period, attack the currency, drive interna
tional reserves to the lower limit and cause the abandonment of the peg. A
speculative attack will be (weakly) profitable if and only if the exchange rate
does not appreciate as a consequence of the attack, that is

(12)
where At is aggregate net profit from a speculative attack. Loosely speaking,
informed agents will not attack the currency "too early", that is, before the
domestic credit expansion has gone far enough to result in an exchange rate
depreciation when the current parity is abandoned. A rational decision thus
requires agents to compute the post-attack level of the exchange rate.
The key feature of the model that allows agents to pick up the right time
for an attack is the stability of the monetary policy regime described by (8)
and (9). After a speculative attack has driven international reserves to their
lower limit, the policy maker gives up the exchange rate target. From then
on, the level of money supply is exogenously determined and coincides with
domestic credit

mts = ln(Dt+s + R) = dt+s
7

(13)

where a superscript R means "conditional on the abandonment of the peg".
Therefore, the current and expected future money supply after a speculative
attack can be calculated based on the knowledge of the current stock of
domestic credit
8

00

8 )
Et~ l + 8 m~B
(

1 +8
= 1 + 8 - r,odt

(14)

The exchange rate conditional on a speculative attack, denoted by et will be
given by the semi-reduced form (7) evaluated using (14)

(15)
Note that the above expression is valid for any wage rate, including the
equilibrium one, to be discussed in the next section. Flood and Garber
[1984] define et as the shadow exchange rote. The condition for an exchange
rate crisis to occur can be re-defined in terms of the shadow exchange rate

(16)
where, for future reference, we define .D.et as the shadow depreciation rate
{SDR). In each period, the exchange rate parity will be maintained if the
SDR is negative, abandoned otherwise

if ..6.et <

o

(17)

The shadow exchange rate is a linear function of both real and nominal
shocks, Ut and f.t. Figure 1 plots the :fixed parity and the shadow exchange
rate against the support of the combined shock Vt = <frut + f.t, for given wages.
Figure 1 here
The actual exchange rate will coincide with the parity to the left of the
threshold value Vt, where the SDR is below et. It coincides with the shadow
exchange rate to the right of Vt•
The basic mechanism underlying Krugman's analysis is private arbitrage.
Profit-maximizing agents arbitrate profits across the two exchange rate regimes.
It is important to stress that there is no corresponding switch in the mon
etary policy regime. On the contrary, it is the stability of the policy rule
8

defined by (8) and (9) that gives speculators the option to force a crisis by
launching a speculative attack before the point of a "natural collapse". In
equilibrium, the payoff of an optimal exercise of such an option is

Note that ·Figure 1 can also be reinterpreted in terms of such a payoff per
unit of international reserve money.
As well known, Krugman's original specification does not allow for un
certainty. The basic mechanism of an exchange rate crisis following a spec
ulative attack is a deterministic one. Including uncertainty in the model is
nonetheless a meaningful exercise, insofar as it accounts for positive interest
differentials emerging with expectations of a devaluation. Note also that, in
our framework, output is not fixed, but depends on the exchange rate policy.
A crisis raises output and employment, with a positive effect on the demand
for real balances. During the crisis, the sharp contraction in the demand
for money that determines the speculative attack on reserves is exclusively
driven by the increase in the interest rate anticipating a future depreciation.

3.3

Multiple instantaneous equilibria

The case for multiple equilibria in a Krugman-style model of exchange rate
crisis is first presented by Obstfeld [1986], who modifies the assumption of a
stable monetary policy regime. The domestic credit component of the policy
function (8) becomes conditional on the occurrence of a speculative attack

dt+1 dt+1

-

1Jdt + et if speculative attack
d
otherwise

(18)

The stability of the exchange rate then depends on what the private sector
does 2 • For a given level of wages, over some range of the support of the
exogenous shocks Vt two instantaneous equilibria are possible: if agents at
tack the currency, the policy maker switches monetary regime and the fixed
exchange rate regime collapses; if there is no speculative attack, the policy
maker maintains a behavior consistent with the survival of the peg. Such a
2 0bstfeld

[1986] carefully restricts the parameters as to rule out the possibility of a
natural collapse in the absense of a speculative attack.
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specification runs into the problem of defining what determines the coordina
tion of private agents on one of the two possible equilibria. The coordination
mechanism is usually assumed to be driven by exogenous uncertainty.
It is worth stressing that, in our specification, there is an additional chan
nel through which multiple instantaneous equilibria may emerge, different
from the one proposed by Obstfeld [1986]. This channel is the expectations
game between the private and the public sectors underlying the determina
tion of nominal wages, to be further discussed at the end of Section 4.
Consider again the process of domestic credit expansion (8) and focus on
the determination of nominal wages given by expression (2). By writing out
this expression, the nominal wage will be equal to the current parity plus the
expected depreciation rate
(19)
where 'lrt is the probability of a devaluation in period t. By (16), 7rt coincides
with the probability that the shadow depreciation rate be positive

What raises the possibility of multiple equilibria is the fact that the shadow
depreciation rate is itself a function of nominal wages. It turns out that,
for a large class of distribution of shocks, the equilibrium nominal wage may
· not be unique. In appendix I we solve for the rational expectations level of
nominal wage, and present a simple example where multiple equilibria may
arise with a uniform distribution of the shock Vt.
In the presence of multiplicity of equilibria, anticipations of exchange rate
instability leads to high nominal wages, that reduce output and determine
a drop in money demand. For a given level of domestic credit, the drop
· in money demand translates into a contraction of the stock of international
reserves. This is the channel through which high nominal wages increase the
probability of a devaluation in a self-fulfilling way. Conversely, low nominal
wages are associated with a higher output, that raises money demand. The
rate of depletion of international reserves is slowed down. As a result, low
wages decrease the probability of a devaluation, making the current parity
less vulnerable to nominal and real shocks. The stability of the exchange rate
parity during the current period depends on which equilibrium wage setters
coordinate their expectations when contracts are signed.

10

4

The "endogeno us policy approach"

A different approach to exchange rate crises stresses the fact that abandoning
a fixed exchange rate regime is ultimately a policy choice. Policy makers
are now the main actors on stage: in the analysis, private agents arbitrating
profits are replaced by policy makers arbitrating social utility across exchange
rate regimes. In order to highlight analogies and differences with the previous
approach, we will use the same layout of the model as in section 3. Our
analysis thus begins with the description of monetary policy in relation to
the policy makers' objective function.

4.1

Policy preferences

In the context of the endogenous policy approach, a policy function is derived
from "first principles" rather than posited by assumption. In our specifica
tion, a policy maker lacking anti-inflationary credibility uses the exchange
rate as an imperfect commitment device. At the beginning of each period,
before wage contracts are signed, she commits to pursue a unilateral peg.
Such a commitment is credible only to the extent that the incentive to re
nege on it after wage contracts are signed is offset by some cost of abandoning
the peg. Her objective function thus includes two components. The first one
is the usual quadratic loss function that expresses the inflation-employm ent
trade-off. The second component of the objective function is a lump-sum
welfare cost, paid by the policy maker in the event of a devaluation.
The policy maker minimizes the following loss function:
00

Lt =

I: Et [,8 ft+s + Ct+sZt+s] =

(20)

8

s=O

00

I: Et/3
s=O

8
{

0 (pt+s

- Pt+s-1)

2

+ (Yt+s -

y*)2

+ Ct+sZt+s}

where /3 is the discount factor, ft is the one-period loss function, y* is the
target level of output, greater than the market equilibrium level (Yt=O), 0
measures the aversion towards inflation, Ct is the lump sum welfare cost of
reneging on the exchange rate commitment, and Zt is a dummy variable
assuming the value of one in case of realignment and zero otherwise:

(21)
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Zt

=

l if et =I= et

In the tradition of Kydland and Prescott [1977) and Barro and Gordon [1983),
the policy maker's preference for a target output greater than the equilibrium
one3 induces an inflationary bias in policy making. With rational expecta
tions, private agents are aware of the ex-post incentive for the policy maker
to resort to a surprise inflation-devaluation. Expected inflation can be con
tained only if such an incentive is reduced or eliminated altogether. In our
specification, the fixed exchange rate is at least imperfectly credible because
abandoning the peg entails welfare costs. We adopt the simplifying assump
tion of treating this cost as a political cost associated to a devaluation, ex
ogenously given, reflecting the loss of prestige due to a surprise devaluation.
Consistently, we assume that the private sector does not behave strategically
over time and current expectations are independent of past policy choices.
Alternatively, the realignment costs could be endogenously modelled as rep
utation costs, emerging from the repeated game between the private and the
public sector. 4
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of each period,
the policy maker announces that she will defend the current level of the
exchange rate et = et-I• Given such an announcement, workers sign wage
contracts prior to the realization of current shocks - so that prices are ex
ante flexible -. During the period, given nominal wages, the public sector
optimally chooses its monetary policy contingent on the realization of the
shocks.
3

The preference for a level of output larger than the equilibrium one is generally mo
tivated by referring to the existence of distortions that make the market equilibrium
suboptimal.
4
In a more general specification of our model, the variable Ct can be reinterpreted
as a synthetic indicator of all intertemporal implications of a surprise abandonement of
the exchange rate. In this case, the dummy variable Zt would express the intertemporal
strategies of the private sector in a repeated game with the public sector. For example, we
may assume that, when the policy maker reneges on her commitments, the private sector
will not believe her announcement for S periods. During this time span, a unilateral peg
would completely loose credibility: Zt+s = 1, for s=l,2,... ,S. The only possible equilibrium
would be one with floating exchange rates and a discretionary monetary policy. In our
paper, we rule out the possibility that private agents coordinate their expectations over
time. Thus, Zt has no memory of the past. Using Obstfeld's [1994] terminology, agents
form memoryless expectations.
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4.2

Realignments and social welfare arbitrage

In each period, the policy maker can choose between defending and aban
doning the exchange rate parity. If she chooses to defend the current parity,
money supply must accommodate all monetary and real shocks hitting the
economy at the time. Money supply conditional on defending the peg, de
noted by mF, will be as follows:

If the policy maker chooses to abandon the exchange rate target, it is rational
to pursue a discretionary optimal monetary policy. In general, a multi-period
loss function such as (20) makes the identification of an optimal policy rather
complicated, because current actions may affect the future state of the econ
omy. This is not the case in our analysis: the model has no proper state
variables, wage contracts last only one period and private sector expecta
tions do not depend on past behavior of the policy makers .. Because of these
features of the model, monetary policy only affects the current state of the
economy, and the optimal policy can be identified by minimizing the current
period loss function ft. The optimal supply of money conditional on aban
doning the nominal parity, mR, is determined by the first order condition:
(23)
Consistently with our analysis of the Krugman's approach, we define the
shadow depreciation rate ~et as the devaluation rate that follows the aban
donment of the peg. In the present context, the SDR corresponds to the
monetary policy implicitly determined by the condition (23).
The policy maker will rationally choose between the two possible mone
tary policy regimes (mF and mR) comparing their relative costs and benefits
in terms of the loss function (20). The exchange rate parity will be given up
if and only if social welfare in a flexible exchange rate regime (-ff) exceeds
social welfare in a fixed exchange rate regime (-ff) at least by the fixed cost
Ct:

(24)

devalue iff
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Note that, since mR is the money supply that minimizes the one period loss
function, by construction the left hand side of the above inequality cannot
2:'.: 0). Without a positive realignment cost Ct, the
be negative (i.e.
policy maker's commitment to a fixed exchange rate would never be credible.
The condition (24) is the analog of the private arbitrage condition (12) in
section 3. There are two differences. First, the main actor is not the market,
but the policy-maker, who has the option of switching between monetary pol
icy regimes: what is maximized is social welfare, rather than private profits.
Second, there are fixed costs in exercising the regime switch, that are absent
in Section 3.5 Notwithstanding these differences, both conditions ((24) and
(12)) can be expressed in terms of the shadow depreciation rate only.
To begin with, note that the shadow depreciation rate is a function of
wages, real shocks and policy targets. By using (23), we have

.er - .er

(25)
It is instructive to interpret the difference between output in a peg and target
output ( yf - y*) as a measure of the deflationary gap due to the defense of
the current nommal parity. The above expression makes us aware that there
is a linear relationship between the SDR and the deflationary gap associated
with the defense of the peg. Because of this property of the model, we can
eliminate output from the social arbitrage condition (24), as to obtain
(26)

devalue iff

The policy maker will optimally switch from defending the peg to pursuing
a discretionary monetary policy when the shadow depreciation rate (in ab
solute value) exceeds a critical threshold cf. The value of such a threshold is
positively related to the welfare cost of abandoning the peg Ct- Clearly, there
is a formal equivalence between the above expression and the devaluation
condition in the Krugman-style model of Section 3 (16). The analogy is best
understood by considering that expression (26) translates the welfare costs
and benefits of a devaluation into the metric of the exchange rate. This is
the same metric chosen by Flood and Garber in which to cast the Krugman
5 Of

course, we could include transaction costs in the Krugman-style model of specu
lative attacks. This would delay the crisis up to the point in which the shadow exchange
rate exceeds the current parity by at least the magnitude of these transaction costs.

14

model6 • Note that, differently from (16), the above condition is consistent
with both an optimal devaluation and an optimal revaluation following the
abandonment of the peg. This is due to assuming a quadratic loss function.
With optimizing policy makers, the exchange rate behavior can be sum
marized by a scheme that is analogous to (17):

(28)

Figure 2 plots the actual and the shadow exchange rate against the support
of the real shock, given nominal wages.
Insert figure 2
In order to facilitate the comparison with Figure 1, in plotting Figure 2 we
have restricted the support of the shock in such a way that a re-valuation
will never be optimal. An apparent difference with Figure 1 is due to the
presence of lump-sum costs of a realignment, that accounts for the "jump"
in the actual exchange rate. 7 A second, more crucial, difference with Figure
1 is that e't is not conditional on monetary shocks: this variable is plotted
against the support of the real shock only. As opposed to Krugman's model,
in the present context there is no constraint on monetary policy. In other
words, there is neither an exogenously given process driving domestic credit,
nor a lower bound on international reserves. In pursuing her employment
and inflation targets, the policy maker will always and fully accommodate
monetary shocks.
6 We

could also express the switching rule in terms of the output gap:
devalue iff

IY[ -y; I~

(27)

where cf expresses the opportunity cost of defending the exchange rate in terms of per
centage points of output (with respect to the target) sacrificed to exchange rate stability.
7 Transaction costs in Krugman-style models would drive a wedge between the shadow
exchange rate and the defended parity at the threshold value Vt, similar to the one in
Figure 2.
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4.3

Multiple instantaneous equilibria and the role of
speculative attacks

This section analyzes the expectations game between the private and the
public sector underlying the determination of wages. Such a game plays a
more important role here than in the Krugman-style model. In the Krug
man's model, once monetary authorities have set their policy, private agents
can "force" the government to devalue by launching a speculative attack on
the currency that drives reserves to their lower limit. In the endogenous
policy approach, once wage contracts are signed, there is nothing that the
private sector can do to "force" a devaluation. In the architecture of the
model, abandoning the peg is an optimal policy choice. Nonetheless, the pri
vate sector can affect the policy outcome by changing the conditions based
on which policy makers decide their conduct.
In the context of the endogenous policy approach, the optimal policy de
cision is contingent on the real shocks hitting the economy during the period
as well as on the level of nominal wages. When multiple instantaneous equi
libria are possible, over time the policy maker may face different equilibrium
levels of the wage rate. The stability of the peg is thus affected by switches
in the market coordination among possible equilibria. This mechanism pro
vides the theoretical foundations for a theory of self-fulfilling "speculative"
behavior in the modelling style under consideration.
In determining the rational expectations level of the wage rate, multiple
instantaneous equilibria arise for exactly the same reason discussed in section
3. Re-define the probability of devaluation as:

(29)
Then the computation of equilibrium nominal wage combines expectations of
the exchange rates in the two possible regimes, weighted by the corresponding
probabilities:

(30)
As before, multiple instantaneous equilibria stem from the fact that the
shadow depreciation rate is itself a function of nominal wages. Details are
given in the Appendix II.
With multiple equilibria, the stability of the exchange rate regime depends
on the equilibrium on which private agents coordinate their expectations.
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We carry out a simulation of the model using the same parameter values as
in Obstfeld [1994]. 8 In the simulation, we obtain two equilibria: a vicious
equilibrium, characterized by high expected inflation and a high ex ante
probability of devaluation; and a more stable, virtuous equilibrium, where
expected inflation and therefore the wage rate are low.
Figure 3 here
Figure 3c plots the differential of the loss function ft in the two regimes
(given by the left hand side of (24)) as well as a particular value of the
cost Ct against the support of the shock Ut. The loss differential draws a
non-linear function that crosses the cost line twice, identifying two possible
equilibrium thresholds iit. 9 The lower trigger point is associated with high
equilibrium wage inflation. At the current parity, this implies a sharp decline
in competitiveness and stagflation. Abandoning the peg turns out to be
optimal for a wide range of productivity shocks, including favorable but small
ones. Figure 3b draws the shadow exchange rate in such an equilibrium. As
apparent from the graph, the stability of the exchange rate parity is possible
only for large favorable shocks (on the left side of the plot). Conversely,
the higher trigger point is associated with moderate inflation expectations.
The average deflationary gap due to the defense of the peg is small, and
10
a devaluation is optimal only for sizeable negative shocks. The graph in
Figure 3a plots the corresponding shadow exchange rate. It is worth stressing
that expectations are self-fulfilling in both equilibria: 'as the optimal policy is
conditional on nominal wages, rationally formed expectations are confirmed
on average by actual policy making.
Modelling speculative attacks as self-fulfilling prophecies requires a move
from the identification of multiple instantaneous equilibria to the analysis
graph is drawn for the following parameters values : a = 1, 0 = .15, y• = .01,
µ=.03.
9
Clearly, for sufficiently low values of the political cost, there could be no interior
solution. The threshold level of ut would correspond to the lower bound of the support
so that the peg would not be credible. We have a unique solution when the cost line is
tangent to the non linear function. If the support of the shock is bounded to the right,
a sufficiently high value of the cost can assure perfect credibility to the exchange rate
regime.
10 A simple exercise of comparative statics shows that an increase in the cost of realign
ment enhances the credibility of the commitment to a fixed exchange rate, but only in the
virtuous equilibrium. The opposite is true in the vicious equilibrium.
8 The
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of a dynamic economy in real time. Even when the economy is in the vir
tuous equilibrium of Figure 3a - the argument goes - one cannot rule out
that a sudden shift in the regime of expectations will reduce the stability of
the exchange rate parity one period ahead, by moving the economy to the
vicious equilibrium of Figure 3b. Unfortunately, the literature has not (yet)
provided a convincing theory of how expectations coordinate on a particular
regime over time. As pointed out in Section 3, the coordination mechanism
is generally modelled by resorting to exogenous uncertainty, that is, by spec
ifying an ex ante arbitrary probability distribution defined over all possible
equilibria.
Insofar as such a shift in coordination increases the probability of a deval
uation and the equilibrium interest rate, it also causes a contraction in money
demand at the time when expectations are formed. The shift from the good
to the bad equilibrium leads to a speculative attack on the currency. Such a
speculative attack, however, has no direct consequence on the stability of the
exchange rate. The shadow depreciation rate does not depend on monetary
shocks, and a shift in the regime of expectations affects policy making only
through the level of wages.

5

Conclusions

This paper has contrasted two styles of modelling exchange rate crises within
a common analytical framework. The first style is initiated by Krugman
[1979], who models speculative attacks as the proximate cause of a currency
collapse. The focus is on market behavior. According to the second style the "endogenous policy approach" - the abandonment of a peg is ultimately
a policy decision. The focus is on optimal exchange rate policy by rational
policy makers. Building on our common framework, we have discussed two
analyses of a currency crisis, each representative of a particular modelling
style.
In Section 4, we have shown that, in the model we have taken as represen
tative of the endogenous policy approach, the defense of the exchange rate
during the period does not depend on the realization of monetary shocks.
Provided that maintaining the peg is the optimal strategy for the policy
maker, money supply will fully accommodate shocks to velocity and foreign
interest rate. This characteristic of the model can be related to the well
known result in the literature on the optimal choice of exchange rate regimes
18

first shown by Poole [1970].
The model of section 4 does not include any constraint on monetary
policy, in the form of either lower bounds on foreign reserves or domestic
credit requirements. This is to stress the point that the abandonment of the
exchange rate parity is a policy choice, rather than an event due to technical
reasons (such as the depletion of the stock of international reserves). After
all, as Obstfeld and Rogoff [1995] put it, the exchange rate is the price of one
currency in terms of another: the monetary authorities can always defend a
given exchange rate parity, provided they are willing to reduce the supply
of the domestic currency to an appropriately low level. Even if domestic
credit is fixed, it is still possible to defend the peg through repeated sales of
borrowed international reserves (see Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1996] for
a discussion).
These considerations are particularly important in the presence of mul
tiple instantaneous equilibria. At the time when expectations are formed,
a shift from a virtuous to a vicious equilibrium increases the probability of
abandoning the parity and, via the increase in the interest rate, leads to a
contemporaneous contraction of money demand. However, even if the drop
in demand drives down foreign exchange reserves, the speculative attack per
se does not play any role in the exchange rate crisis. As a matter of facts,
an interest sensitive demand for money is not even a necessary feature of
models following the endogenous policy approach (see Obstfeld [1995] and
Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1996] among others). The differences with the
Krugman-style model of section 3 are apparent. There, for a crisis to occur,
money demand has to be interest-sensitive; moreover, both an exogenous
process driving domestic credit and a lower bound on reserves are necessary
elements in the analysis.
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to conclude that :financial shocks
and international reserves can only play a role in Krugman-style models of
exchange rate crises. For instance, a more general specification of the public
sector in Section 4 could stress the social welfare implications of acquiring
reserves, by assuming (realistically) that reserves can be borrowed in the
international markets at an increasing marginal cost (as in Buiter [1987]).
In this case, costs and benefits of defending the peg would also depend on
the opportunity costs of intervening in the foreign exchange market, with the
stock of international reserves playing an important role in the dynamics of
the crisis.
The analysis in this paper has stressed the fact that multiple instanta19

neous equilibria are not a specific feature of a particular modelling style. We
have discussed a common kind of multiplicity that arise in the expectations
game between the private and the public sectors when the exchange rate pol
icy is not perfectly credible. While we have focused on nominal wage rigidity,
Obstfeld [1994] provides an example based on nominal interest rates.
In conclusion, there is a question of whether different modelling styles
apply to different kinds of currency crises or, rather, they tell the same story
from a different vantage point. Although a definite answer to this question
may not exist, we find more useful to think of them as complementing each
other in offering a theoretical perspective on exchange rate crises. We also be
lieve that the modelling patterns discussed in this paper provide an insightful
and efficient classification scheme of the literature so far developed.
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Appendix I
This appendix discusses the determination of the equilibrium nominal
wage in the Krugman-style model. Substituting (19) in the semi-reduced
form of the exchange rate conditional on the occurrence of a speculative
attack (15), the equilibrium nominal wage must satisfy
Wt

=

(1 - 7rt) (1 + 8 + a<f>)et
1 + 8 + (1 - 11"t)a</>

+

mR]

7l"t
[
~
(1 + 8)
1 + 0 + (l _ 11"t)a</> Et-dVt I L).et 2 0) + 1 + 0 _ 118

For a given money supply, the computation of the equilibrium nominal wage
requires the identification of a threshold value of the shock Vt such that, for
any realization of the shock larger than this threshold, the private sector will
launch a speculative attack leading to a currency depreciation. The threshold
value Vt can be computed by including the above expression in the switching
rule (16). We obtain

_
mf
-et + 1 + 8 - 7JO
1

a</>

+ 1 + 8 + a<f>
[

l+o+a</> l+

1l"tEt-1(vt I Vt 2th)
1+8
+
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l+o

>
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A solution for Vt is derived by evaluating this expression with the equality
sign. In general, the resulting equation will be non linear. For example, as
sume that Vt is uniformly distributed between-µ andµ. Then, our equation
becomes quadratic in Vt

[-e. +

1 +:~ ~· + 1+ ;~ a¢, 4 {1: •i

l

=

0

Provided that the current parity has at least some credibility, the interior
solution for the threshold value of the shock - when it exists - is not necessarily
unique.
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Appendix II
This appendix describes the determination of the equilibrium nominal
wage in the model of Section 4. In the endogenous policy approach, ex
pectations of the exchange rate are determined considering the two possible
monetary regimes, m[ and m{l. Using (2) and (25), and restricting the sup
port of the shock as to rule out equilibrium re-valuation, equilibrium nominal
wages can be expressed as follows

With rational expectations, nominal wages must be consistent with the policy
makers' switching rule; we thus substitute the above expression in (26) as to
obtain

As in Appendix I, it is possible to characterize the equilibrium condition
in terms of a threshold value of the real shock, Ut, such that the policy
makers will optimally devalue for any realization of the shock larger than
this threshold. The equilibrium value of Ut can be computed by finding the
roots of the inequality just specified. In general, we will have to solve a non
linear equation, so that, if an interior solution exists, the equilibrium value of
Ut will not be unique. For example when Ut is uniformly distributed between
-µ and µ, we solve the following quadratic equation
1.o:2
2

+ ceo:fl..
+ 0 -2 + o:2 + 0 + Ceo.a
t µ, _ +
t µ,

2µ

2

Ut

Ut

l

[y (a' +o) + ¼a'µ+C: (3;

0

3

+ ~ + ~)] = O

Note that there cannot be multiple equilibria if the devaluation cost is either
too low (so that the parity is not credible at all) or very high (so that the
exchange rate regime is perfectly credible). Multiple equilibria only arise if
the credibility of the exchange rate regime imperfect.
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Figure 1
Krugman-sty le model
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